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EXPRESSIVE APs AND EXPLETIVE NPs REVISITED:  1 
REFINING THE EXTANT RELEVANCE-THEORETIC PROCEDURAL ACCOUNT  2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
In the third stage in the development of the notion of procedural meaning, relevance 5 
theorists analysed expressive devices like intonation, interjections, expressive APs, 6 
expletive NPs, slurs and paralanguage. This paper revisits expressive APs and 7 
expletive NPs by arguing that the emotional-state descriptions they trigger only take 8 
within their scope a propositional constituent. Such shorter-ranging mental structure 9 
does not fit neatly in the definition of higher-level explicature, so two possible solutions 10 
are proposed in order to accommodate it within the relevance-theoretic notional 11 
apparatus, the second of which could involve a refinement of the distinction between 12 
lower- and higher-level explicatures. Moreover, that type of constituent-directed 13 
description is shown to be also enacted by other expressives and other linguistic 14 
expressions, and to be constructed in other communicative acts. Finally, since the 15 
words functioning as expressive APs and expletive NPs come from various lexical 16 
categories, an account of the lexical-pragmatic processes enabling their transfer is 17 
given. 18 
 19 
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1. Introduction 23 
Consider the following utterances in English and Spanish: 24 
(1) The fucking lady was so lucky that she did not get stuck between the car and 25 
the wall! 26 
(2) Peter has got the damned flashlight. 27 
(3) ¡Déjame de una vez el jodido libro!  28 
‘Lend me the fucking/blasted book at once!’ 29 
(4) Llevo toda la tarde con la dichosa ponencia.  30 
‘I have been working on the bleeding presentation the whole afternoon’. 31 
(5) Juan es un puñetero imbécil; se ha olvidado las entradas en su casa.  32 
‘John is a fucking idiot; he forgot the tickets at home’. 33 
(6) No he visto al puto niño.  34 
‘I haven’t seen the bloody bastard’. 35 
In them, the head of a noun phrase seems to be modified by the italicised present and 36 
past participles ‘fucking’, ‘damned’ and ‘jodido’ (1-3), the adjectives ‘dichosa’ and 37 
‘puñetero’ (4-5), and the noun ‘puto’ (6). Despite their adnominal position, those words 38 
do not function as adjectives or generate adjectival phrases.  39 
Like other content words, adjectives encode concepts consisting of a logical entry 40 
with information about their set of stable logical properties, a lexical entry with 41 
information about the natural-language words used to express them and their 42 
grammatical characteristics, and an encyclopaedic entry with their extension and/or 43 
denotation –states, qualities or properties connected with notions such as shape, taste, 44 
size, colour, judgement, etc. (Börjars and Burridge 2001: 62; Huddleston 1988: 108)–  45 
as well as varied, idiosyncratic information connected with them (Carston 2016: 155; 46 
Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 92-93)1. Clearly, none of the words above refer to 47 
stable qualities or scalar properties. Neither do they have heightening or lowering 48 
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 These entries are what most atomic, unstructured concepts have, but others may lack one of them. 
effects, nor do they fulfil a restrictive function. Impossibility to intensify or gradate the 49 
participles ‘fucking’ or ‘damned’ in (1-2) and to add prefixes to them further reveal that 50 
they are not adjectives2. Furthermore, both in English and in Spanish, moving those 51 
words to predicative position or replacing them with defining relative clauses would 52 
involve illicit transformations that alter what speakers intend to communicate when 53 
those words appear in pre-nominal position (Börjars and Burridge 2001: 64-65; Collins 54 
and Hollo 2000: 80-81; Greenbaum and Quirk 1993: 142; Haegeman and Guéron 55 
1999: 56-57, 71-72; Huddleston 1988: 108-110): 56 
(7) The lady who/that was fucking was so lucky that… 57 
(8) Peter has got the flashlight that is/was damned. 58 
(9) ¡Dame de una vez el libro que está jodido!  59 
‘Give me the book that is broken/busted at once!’ 60 
The words in question, which are transferred from various lexical categories, are no 61 
doubt the vehicle by means of which speakers voice something elusive and ineffable: 62 
attitudes, feelings and/or emotions (Blakemore 2011; Potts 2007a, 2007b). They are 63 
expressives, a label subsuming a wide array of (non-)linguistic elements like expletive 64 
and non-expletive nominal epithets (‘the bastard’, ‘el puto’), slurs (‘hori’, ‘chink’), 65 
primary and secondary interjections (‘wow’, ‘oh’, ‘shit’, ‘damn’), prosody or gestures, to 66 
name but a few (Blakemore 2011: 3537, 2015). This paper purports to develop an 67 
account of expressive APs and expletive NPs which answers the following questions: 68 
(i) How are expressive APs and expletive NPs used to communicate? 69 
(ii) What do they contribute to communication? 70 
(iii) What made it possible for elements from diverse lexical categories to achieve 71 
expressive functions? 72 
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 In Spanish, in contrast, some speakers could intensify or gradate the alleged participle ‘jodido/a’ in (3) 
and the alleged noun ‘puto’ in (6). 
Despite their syntactic position, expressive APs and expletive NPs do not provide 73 
descriptive, truth-conditional information about the properties of the referents of the 74 
nouns they accompany, as Section 2 shows. Expressive APs and expletive NPs 75 
resemble interjections, intonation and gestures in that they provide direct evidence for 76 
speaker meaning, which is, however, difficult to paraphrase. Nevertheless, their 77 
specialisation to express certain emotions in specific, maybe repeated circumstances 78 
or by certain language users, might activate specific conceptual representations, even 79 
if vague or in need of subsequent fine-tuning. This would enable expressive APs and 80 
expletive NPs to communicate by also providing some indirect evidence for speaker 81 
meaning. Section 3 discusses the manner whereby they communicate on the basis of 82 
the showing-meaningNN distinction (Blakemore 2011, 2015; Grice 1957; Wharton 83 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2009). 84 
The elusiveness of what expressive APs and expletive NPs communicate suggests 85 
that their contribution to communication calls for an alternative explanation. This paper 86 
endorses a procedural perspective, and treats expressive APs and expletive NPs as 87 
encoders of mental instructions or procedures (Blakemore 1987, 2002; Wilson and 88 
Sperber 1993, 2002, 2004). Like interjections, intonation or attitudinal adverbials 89 
(Blakemore 2011, 2015; Ifantidou 1992, 1993a; Wharton 2003, 2009, 2016; Wilson 90 
and Wharton 2006), expressive APs and expletive NPs are claimed in Section 4 to 91 
encode instructions targeting emotion-reading mechanisms (Sperber and Wilson 92 
1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). However, the procedural analysis this 93 
paper proposes differs from the initial one of interjections, intonation or attitudinal 94 
adverbials in some respects. The attitudinal or emotional descriptions that expressive 95 
APs and expletive NPs are argued to enact will be shown not to be about something 96 
manifest in the speaker’s cognitive environment or about a proposition that she3 97 
expresses, but to be confined to a constituent of a proposition: namely, the referent of 98 
a noun. In this respect, expressive APs and expletive NPs resemble slurs, which voice 99 
attitudes towards the referents that they denote (Blakemore 2015).  100 
This procedural analysis, on the one hand, lends support to a non-unitary account 101 
of the broad group of expressives (Blakemore 2015). On the other hand, it might imply 102 
that the relevance-theoretic notional apparatus could be refined with a view to 103 
accommodating the shorter-ranging attitudinal descriptions illustrated here, as these 104 
differ significantly from higher-level explicatures. These constituent-focused 105 
descriptions will furthermore be shown to be the output of other linguistic expressions 106 
that do not necessarily fall within the category of expressive meaning, and to be 107 
constructed in the processing of various communicative acts.  108 
To conclude, Section 5 discusses why items initially belonging to distinct lexical 109 
categories might develop an expressive function. Although the development of such a 110 
function is explained as a result of grammaticalisation and subjectification, a proposal 111 
is made about the processes that might propel what this paper calls the 112 
proceduralisation of those lexical items. This proposal rests on current relevance-113 
theoretic postulates on lexical pragmatics, as well as on some semantic processes 114 
frequent in children’s speech. 115 
 116 
2. Expressive APs and expletive NPs, and the proposition expressed 117 
Content words encode concepts that become constituents of conceptual 118 
representations (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 16). Concepts may be “[…] brought to 119 
consciousness, reflected on and used in general inference” (Wilson 2016: 11). 120 
                                                          
3
 Following a relevance-theoretic convention, reference to the speaker will be made through the feminine 
pronoun while reference to the hearer will be made through the masculine counterpart. 
Although many concepts are verbalised by means of single words, concept-word 121 
correspondences are not always exhaustive: single concepts map onto different words 122 
or phrases, various concepts map onto the same word or some concepts are not 123 
expressible at all through words (Sperber and Wilson 1997; Wilson and Sperber 1993).  124 
Decoded concepts become part of the logical form of an utterance (Carston 2016; 125 
Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), which must undergo various inferential processes to 126 
become truth-evaluable: reference assignment, disambiguation, recovery of 127 
unarticulated constituents and conceptual adjustment. Interaction with other concepts 128 
and contextual information adjust a lexically encoded concept, so that its denotation 129 
becomes more specific (narrowed) or more general (broadened): “[…] either a proper 130 
subset or a superset of [its original] denotation […]”, although it may also be “[…] a 131 
combination, both extending the lexical denotation and excluding some part of it” 132 
(Carston 2016: 156). If the resulting concept is an occasion-specific one, it is an ad 133 
hoc concept (Carston 1997, 2002, 2013, 2016; Sperber and Wilson 2008; 134 
Wałaszewska 2015; Wilson 2004; Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007). The meaning of 135 
most words, therefore, is sometimes thought of as semantically underspecified and in 136 
need of modulating before it can provide some specific content; to put it differently, 137 
most words behave as if they encoded pro-concepts that need working out (Sperber 138 
and Wilson 1997). 139 
The inferential operations mentioned above yield the lower-level explicature, which 140 
is a truth-evaluable proposition corresponding to ‘what is said’. Adjectival modifiers 141 
clearly contribute to lower-level explicatures and such contribution is relatively 142 
straightforward to check: elimination or replacement with another adjective or 143 
participial adjective, as well as intensification or gradation, alter the meaning of the 144 
proposition expressed and, therefore, its truth conditions (10). Additionally, movement 145 
from the attributive to the predicative position does not alter the meaning of the 146 
resulting sentence (11): 147 
(10) a. John cut down the [(very/extremely) tall/green] tree. 148 
b. John attended a(n)[(very/most) interesting/boring] lecture. 149 
(11) a. The green/tall tree = The tree is green/tall. 150 
b. An interesting lecture = The lecture is interesting. 151 
c. A worried man = The man is worried. 152 
Participial adjectives may also be substituted by a defining relative clause without any 153 
effect on the proposition expressed: 154 
(12) a. The lost property > The property that was/has been lost. 155 
b. The escaped prisoner > The prisoner who (has/had) escaped. 156 
Expressive APs and expletive NPs do not encode concepts denoting conditions or 157 
(scalar) properties describing nouns. In their case, adnominal position does not involve 158 
an adjectival meaning or function. What they encode in utterances like (1-6), if 159 
anything, does not seem to be part of the proposition expressed and, hence, does not 160 
have any impact on its truth conditions. If those words were eliminated, the resulting 161 
proposition would remain the same, although some indication of the speaker’s feeling 162 
about or attitude to one of its constituents would obviously disappear: 163 
(13) The lady was so lucky that she did not get stuck between the car and wall!  164 
To some extent, expressive APs and expletive NPs behave like attitudinal adverbs 165 
such as ‘unfortunately’ and ‘sadly’, which indicate the speaker’s attitude to an assertion 166 
(Ifantidou 1992, 1993a): 167 
(14) a. Unfortunately, John has left the party. 168 
b. Sadly, the beautiful princess has died. 169 
Semantically external to the proposition expressed, the adverbials they give rise to 170 
modify the assertion without contributing to its truth conditions (Strawson 1973, quoted 171 
in Ifantidou 1992, 1993a; Urmson 1952). Embedding an utterance containing an 172 
attitudinal adverbial into a conditional structure shows that the adverbial does not affect 173 
its truth conditions because it is outside the scope of the conditional operator (Ifantidou 174 
1992, 1993a). Accordingly, if (14a) was slightly adapted as (15a) in order to prevent it 175 
from sounding odd when embedded into a conditional structure (15b), the speaker 176 
would not be saying that they will all leave in the event that (15c) was true, but in the 177 
event that (15d) was true:  178 
(15) a. John has unfortunately left the party. 179 
b. If John has unfortunately left the party, we will all leave too. 180 
c. It is unfortunate that John has left the party. 181 
d. John has left the party. 182 
Attitudinal adverbs, however, convey information that may be true or false in itself, 183 
which reveals their conceptual status. A speaker who employs a specific attitudinal 184 
adverb may be contradicted by someone who knows or discovers that what she says 185 
is false (16). Their conceptual status is additionally attested by the existence of 186 
synonymous manner-adverbial counterparts that determine the truth conditions of the 187 
utterances where they occur (17), the possibility to be intensified (18) or integration in 188 
more complex syntactic structures (19) (Ifantidou 1992: 207-208): 189 
(16) It is not unfortunate! We are all happy that he left! He is so boring! 190 
(17) It is unfortunately true that John left the party. 191 
(18) Quite/Very unfortunately, John left the party. 192 
(19) Quite unfortunately and very regrettably, John left the party. 193 
Lack of intensification, impossibility to be gradated, meaning shift when placed in 194 
predicative position or replaced by a corresponding defining relative clause all support 195 
the conclusion that the nouns, adjectives and participles functioning as expressive APs 196 
or expletive NPs have lost their original descriptive content. As with attitudinal adverbs, 197 
embedding an utterance containing an expressive AP or expletive NP into a conditional 198 
structure reveals that they do not fall within the scope of the conditional operator, so 199 
they do not affect the truth conditions of the utterance either. If (20a) was embedded 200 
into a conditional structure like (20b), the speaker would be understood to be 201 
recommending to take the lady to hospital provided (20c) was true, but not in the case 202 
that (20d) was true:  203 
(20) a. That fucking lady has been hit by the lamp. 204 
b. If that fucking lady has been hit by the lamp, someone should take her to 205 
hospital. 206 
c. A particular lady has been hit by the lamp. 207 
d. A particular lady who was fucking has been hit by the lamp. 208 
As opposed to attitudinal adverbs, the feeling or attitude that expressive APs and 209 
expletive NPs express cannot be denied, so a reaction like (21b) to a (21a) would 210 
sound odd, as it would not make much sense to challenge, reject or question what the 211 
speaker feels (Potts 2005: 158): 212 
(21) a. That fucking lady was hit by a lamp! 213 
b. She is not a fucking lady. 214 
Expressive APs and expletive NPs certainly display attitudes, feelings or emotions just 215 
as shrieks or interjections do. They do not amount to “[…] a proposition that can be 216 
cancelled, but [are] simply […] means of displaying an emotion tied to the utterance in 217 
which [they are] used” (Blakemore 2015: 26). If any at all, a possible reaction to an 218 
utterance containing an expressive AP or expletive NP would be a dissenting opinion 219 
to their usage, provided it were considered inappropriate or unfair. This might suggest 220 
that those words could nevertheless encode some content, even if vague or nebulous: 221 
(22) a. That fucking lady was hit by a lamp! 222 
b. Come on! Do not say she is a fucking lady!/Do not call her a fucking lady! 223 
She is a loving and caring woman. 224 
Occurrence in adnominal position and modification of nominal heads could initially 225 
lead to regard some nouns, adjectives and participles as adjectival, but the tests 226 
adduced prove that they clearly lack adjectival semantics and function. Such words 227 
are proper expressives and convey information about something ungraspable in 228 
precise conceptual and lexical terms (Blakemore 2011, 2015; Potts 2007a, 2007b). 229 
The ineffability of what they communicate suggests that a procedural analysis is better-230 
suited to unravel their contribution to communication (Blakemore 1987, 2002, 2011, 231 
2015; Wilson and Sperber 1993). But a full account of expressive APs and expletive 232 
NPs must also elucidate if they communicate by simply providing direct evidence of 233 
meaning or if, on the contrary, they also do so in a conventionalised, codified manner.  234 
 235 
3. Expressive APs and expletive NPs, showing and meaningNN 236 
Ideally, communication would succeed if words encoded all that speakers intend to 237 
communicate. This would be fully determinate meaning, a case of pure meaning that 238 
would result in absolute explicitness and allow hearers to accurately paraphrase 239 
speakers’ informative intention (Sperber and Wilson 2015: 135-136). However, 240 
languages often lack the devices to make meaning effable. Time availability, cognitive 241 
abilities or effort allocation may further prevent speakers from thinking of, finding out 242 
or actually using the exact and appropriate expressions to convey their meaning 243 
(Mustajoki 2012; Sperber and Wilson 1995, 1997).  244 
In most cases, coded elements endowed with conventional or non-natural meaning 245 
(meaningNN) are combined with more or less direct intentional evidence of what is 246 
meant: gestures (pointing, shrugging, etc.), facial expressions (smiles, grimaces, 247 
frowns, etc.), intonation, etc. These fall into the category of paralanguage and 248 
somehow display or show what is meant (Wharton 2001, 2002, 2003). They differ from 249 
natural, spontaneous signs providing direct evidence for something and requiring 250 
inference to be interpreted (e.g. shivering) in their evolution, adaptation or refinement 251 
to carry or indicate some meaning by providing direct evidence for the intended 252 
message. Acquisition of communicative function turns them into signals that involve 253 
some encoding, even if their interpretation also requires some amount of inference 254 
(Wharton 2009: 114-115, 2016: 26). 255 
Although (para)linguistic elements can be classified either as tokens of meaningNN 256 
or of showing (Grice 1957), there is a continuum between these poles, along which lie 257 
hybrid elements amounting to more or less direct evidence of meaning while 258 
simultaneously encoding that meaning, even if nebulously (Wharton 2009: 43-47, 259 
2016: 27-29). Determinate showing may also ideally facilitate the expression of 260 
meaning, above all when it is difficult to verbalise, for “showing often involves the 261 
sharing of experiences, or draws on experiential elements of the context” (Sasamoto 262 
and Jackson 2016: 42). Absence of coded elements, unfortunately, makes 263 
communication more liable to failure. If considerable effort is needed to paraphrase 264 
speaker meaning, it becomes semi-determinate; if speaker meaning cannot be 265 
paraphrased at all or more than one proposition is needed, it is fully indeterminate 266 
(Sperber and Wilson 2015: 123-124). Yet, despite the combination of elements 267 
endowed with meaningNN and tokens of showing, on most occasions utterances only 268 
vaguely and approximately transmit what speakers mean (Jucker et al. 2003; Mustajoki 269 
2012)4.  270 
Expressive APs and expletive NPs are means to communicate elusive and fuzzy 271 
things such as attitudes, feelings or emotions, which are hard to conceptualise and, 272 
therefore, to pin down in words (Blakemore 2011, 2015; Potts 2005, 2007a, 2007b). If 273 
expressible through lexical means at all, their nuances or the degree of intensity with 274 
which they are felt might yet escape speakers. Hence, what speakers cannot but do is 275 
expect and trust that hearers will be able to infer these on the grounds of the evidence 276 
they provide.  277 
To some extent, expressive APs and expletive NPs are cases of showing insofar 278 
as, like interjections, intonation or gestures, they amount to relatively direct evidence 279 
for what speakers experience. However, this should not rule out the possibility that 280 
some of them achieve a conceptual status. The fact that the adequacy or fairness of 281 
their usage may be contradicted or dissented from could suggest that expressive APs 282 
and expletive NPs might encode concepts, even if broad or vague –pro-concepts, in 283 
Sperber and Wilson’s (1997) terms. If some of them did, they would be able to meanNN 284 
and thus have a hybrid nature, which would place them at distinct points along the 285 
showing-meaningNN cline. Were this possible, expletive NPs might be closer to the 286 
conceptual pole than expressive APs. 287 
Relevance theorists have analysed intonation as a non-conceptual display of 288 
attitudes and emotions (Wharton 2009; Wilson and Wharton 2006). Interjections would 289 
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 Searle’s (1969) Principle of Expressibility states that whatever can be meant can be said, but whatever 
is said is often not understood as intended. Since background and behavioural/cultural conventions 
vary, individuals may assign differing interpretations to specific utterances. This is basically why a 
Principle of Expression Fallibility would be needed, according to which “it is possible for [an] E[xpression] 
to mean something different from what S[peaker] means (intends to transmit or communicate) by 
uttering it” (Navarro Reyes 2009: 302). 
behave somewhat similarly, although some could have a conceptual semantics 290 
(Wharton 2003, 2009, 2016). They make up a rather heterogeneous lexical category 291 
encompassing elements that only provide vague evidence for speaker meaning and 292 
require a considerable amount of inference, and elements offering less vague evidence 293 
because of their conventionalisation to express specific attitudes, feelings or emotions. 294 
For well-established interjections language users would store and access 295 
encyclopaedic assumptions about their usage and the (range of) attitudes, feelings or 296 
emotions that are normally expressed through them.  297 
Interjections could activate broad concepts like EMOTION or POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 298 
EMOTION5 –i.e. some kind of hypernym. Increase in their degree of conventionalisation 299 
or specialisation to express specific emotions could also facilitate the activation of more 300 
precise concepts. If the label ‘positive emotion’ subsumed emotions like, say, 301 
happiness, pleasure or satisfaction, repeated usage to express happiness, maybe in 302 
similar circumstances, could progressively specialise an interjection in expressing it 303 
and connect that interjection with the more specific concept HAPPINESS. Obviously, that 304 
concept would still need adjusting in order to determine whether what is expressed is 305 
a more intense type of happiness –say, euphoria– or a milder type –e.g. joy. 306 
Accordingly, repeated usage to express specific emotions could trigger a shift from 307 
activation of general concepts to activation of more specific ones and place some 308 
interjections closer to the meaningNN pole (Author 2009a, 2009b; Wharton 2016). 309 
Expressive APs and expletive NPs could also be portrayed as a heterogeneous group 310 
comprising items that only show emotions, items that may activate nebulous emotion-311 
related conceptual representations and items likely to activate more precise emotion-312 
related concepts as a consequence of repetition in similar situations and establishment 313 
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 Following a relevance-theoretic convention, mental concepts are notated in small caps. 
in a language, a variety or a community of practice. The capacity to activate relatively 314 
determinate concepts would enable some expressive APs and expletive NPs to 315 
meanNN and to express semi-determinate meanings (Sperber and Wilson 2015: 123-316 
124). 317 
This notwithstanding, the ineffability and vagueness of what expressive APs and 318 
expletive NPs encode, if anything at all, make them more amenable to a non-319 
translational analysis. Indeed, lack of clear conceptual content often involves encoding 320 
of instructions steering comprehension (Blakemore 2002, 2011, 2015; Wharton 2003, 321 
2009, 2016). Like interjections or intonation, expressive APs and expletive NPs are 322 
also procedural elements, although there seem to be some differences. 323 
 324 
4. Expressive APs and expletive NPs, and procedures 325 
The first stage in the development of the notion of procedural meaning (Carston 2016) 326 
analysed discourse markers as elements constraining the selection of a suitable 327 
interpretive context or the search space for conclusions and relevant interpretations, 328 
thus guiding inferences and reducing cognitive effort (Blakemore 1987, 2002; Hall 329 
2007; Jucker 1993; Rouchota 1995)6. The second stage directed attention to elements 330 
guiding the sort of inferences needed to determine propositional contents (Carston 331 
2016): personal pronouns, deictics or demonstratives, which facilitate reference 332 
assignment (Blakemore 1992; Scott 2011, 2013, 2016; Wilson 2016; Wilson and 333 
Sperber 1993)7, or inflections for tense and aspect, which delimit the temporal frame 334 
of a proposition (Amenós Pons 2011; de Saussure 2012; Escandell Vidal and Leonetti 335 
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 See Moeschler (2016) for a different approach. 
7
 Initially analysed as encoding procedures and some schematic conceptual content (Blakemore 1992; 
Wilson and Sperber 1993), pronouns have recently been treated as purely procedural elements that 
“trigger cognitive processes which constrain the set of potential referents” (Scott 2016: 76; see also 
Schröder 2016). 
2011; Moeschler 2016)8. Additionally, procedural analyses were made of elements 336 
enabling inferences about the sort and amount of evidence for states of affairs alluded 337 
to or the speaker’s degree of commitment to it: mood indicators, word order, evidential 338 
adverbs (‘obviously’, ‘evidently’, etc.), hearsay adverbs (‘allegedly’, ‘reportedly’, etc.), 339 
hearsay particles in some languages or parenthetical phrases (‘I/they 340 
say/believe/claim’, etc.) (Blass 1989, 1990; Ifantidou 1993b, 2001; Itani 1994; Unger 341 
2016; Wilson 2012, 2016; Wilson and Sperber 1993). These “[…] subtle variations in 342 
linguistic form […] may be seen as contributing to inferential comprehension in ways 343 
that are hard to analyse in purely conceptual terms” (Sasamoto and Wilson 2016: 1).  344 
The third stage extended procedural analysis to clusters of expressions assisting 345 
the modules responsible for the identification of emotions or attitudes (Carston 2016; 346 
Wilson 2012, 2016). Since the representation of emotional states is a byproduct of 347 
cognitive processes, linguistic and nonlinguistic devices must trigger procedures 348 
enabling such representation. Attitudinal adverbs like ‘happily’ or ‘unfortunately’ 349 
(Ifantidou 1992, 1993a), intonation, interjections, facial expressions or gestures 350 
(Blakemore 2011, 2015; Itani 1990; Wharton 2003, 2009, 2016; Wilson and Wharton 351 
2006) have been argued to guide the construction of schemas about the speaker’s 352 
attitude to a proposition –higher-level explicatures– whose final format will 353 
nevertheless depend on contextual assumptions about the speaker, setting, recent 354 
events, objects or individuals alluded to, or accompanying paralanguage9. Some of 355 
these expressions range along the showing-meaningNN continuum, although 356 
“Expressing emotion is more about showing than it is about meaningNN” (Wharton 357 
2016: 29).  358 
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 Tense has also been treated as a both procedural and conceptual feature (Grisot and Moeschler 2014; 
Grisot et al. 2016). 
9
 This explains why the procedure encoded by a particular element may result in distinct attitudinal 
descriptions (Blakemore 2011: 3542-3544; Wharton 2009, 2016). 
The notion of procedural meaning has undeniably been a significant contribution to 359 
pragmatics (Author 2016; Sasamoto and Wilson 2016; Wilson 2016). Some linguistic 360 
elements encode instructions steering the modules and mechanisms mediating 361 
comprehension. Procedures are part of the causal structure of the cognitive system 362 
(Carston 2016; Escandell Vidal et al. 2011; Wilson and Sperber 1993) and must be 363 
analysed as dispositions (Bezuidenhout 2004): they “[…] are systematically linked to 364 
states” (Wilson 2011: 10) wherein language users perform specific operations at a sub-365 
personal level. Since each operation “[…] points the hearer in a [particular] direction” 366 
(Wharton 2009: 61), “[…] procedural expressions act as ‘pointers’” (Wilson 2016: 11). 367 
Procedural meaning is non-translational because of its elusiveness and inaccessibility 368 
to consciousness (Carston 2016: 159; Wharton 2009: 61; Wilson 2016: 11; Wilson and 369 
Sperber 1993: 16). Furthermore, procedural expressions (i) do not tend to compose 370 
with each other –i.e. they are non-compositional– (ii) behave rigidly –i.e. their 371 
instructions usually prevail– (iii) do not have nonliteral uses, and (iv) are not 372 
polysemous (Carston 2016: 159-161).  373 
Procedural expressions make up a rather heterogeneous group: some contribute to 374 
the proposition expressed; others constrain higher-level explicatures; others set 375 
relations among propositions or guide access to assumptions; still, others assist 376 
epistemic vigilance mechanisms in their decisions on reliability of information and 377 
informers (Carston 2016: 158-159; Wharton 2009: 65; Wilson 2012)10. Expressive APs 378 
and expletive NPs add to this heterogeneity. Although they enact the construction of 379 
descriptions of the speaker’s attitudes, feelings or emotions in a similar way to 380 
intonation, interjections or attitudinal adverbs and adverbials, the descriptions they give 381 
rise to are slightly different. 382 
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 Carston (2016: 158-159) groups the various relevance-theoretic contributions on procedural meaning 
into four (evolutionary) stages in the development of the notion. 
 383 
4.1. The procedural semantics of expressive APs and expletive NPs 384 
The procedures encoded by gestures, facial expressions, interjections and intonation 385 
activate conceptual schemas amounting to descriptions of the speaker’s attitude to 386 
something manifest in her cognitive environment or to a whole proposition (Wharton 387 
2003, 2009, 2016; Wilson and Wharton 2006). In the latter case, they constrain higher-388 
level explicatures by guiding the formation of a description of what the speaker may 389 
feel towards what she says. Attitudinal adverbs also facilitate the construction of 390 
descriptions like the following (Ifantidou 1992, 1993a): 391 
(23) The speaker is happy/sad/furious that p. 392 
The fact that the speaker’s attitude is projected towards the whole proposition is 393 
evident from their various positions within the utterance –initial (24a), medial (24b) or 394 
final (24c)– and their separation from the other syntactic constituents by means of 395 
pauses, thus forming an independent tone unit or group: 396 
(24) a. Happily, John came to the party. 397 
b. John, happily, came to the party. 398 
c. John came to the party, happily. 399 
Occurrence in different positions and loose insertion in the syntax of the sentence also 400 
suggest that the attitudinal description triggered by interjections also affects the whole 401 
proposition: 402 
(25) a. Wow, John came to the party! 403 
b. John came to the party, wow! 404 
The attitudinal descriptions facilitated by expressive APs and expletive NPs, in 405 
contrast, could not be said to affect the whole proposition expressed. Potts (2005, 406 
2007a, 2007b) considered that an expressive like that in (26a) could give rise to a ‘non-407 
at-issue’ proposition like (26b), where it is evident that the speaker has a particular 408 
attitude towards a certain event:  409 
(26) a. I’ve lost my damn keys. 410 
b. The speaker holds a derogatory attitude towards the fact that he has lost his 411 
keys. 412 
Expressive APs and expletive NPs cannot be detached from the head noun with which 413 
they occur and moved to sentence-initial or final positions:  414 
(27) a. *Fucking, the lady was so lucky that… 415 
b. *The lady was so lucky that she did not get stuck between the car and the 416 
wall, fucking! 417 
Expressive APs and expletive NPs are part of a phrasal constituent: a noun phrase. 418 
Therefore, they do not convey information about the speaker’s attitude to the whole 419 
propositional content of an assertion or towards some fact or event, as Potts (2005, 420 
2007a, 2007b) claimed, but only to a fragment of an assertion: the referent of the noun 421 
that they accompany. Had the speaker intended to express a particular attitude 422 
towards the fact that the lady in (27) was so lucky that something extremely negative 423 
did not happen to her, the speaker would have had to use an interjection and/or the 424 
appropriate intonation and facial expressions: 425 
(28) (Oh) Fuck!/Shit!/Wow! That lady was so lucky that she did not get stuck 426 
between the car and the wall! 427 
Non-detachability of expressive APs and expletive NPs from a nominal head 428 
suggests that the attitudinal description they enact must be about it. Addition of 429 
attitudinal adverbials or interjections to an utterance containing an expressive AP or 430 
an expletive NP further indicates that the respective procedural semantics of these 431 
expressions differ: while that of the former facilitates the construction of higher-level 432 
explicatures, that of the latter do not:  433 
(29) a. Happily, that fucking lady did not get stuck between the car and the wall. 434 
b. Wow, that fucking lady did not get stuck between the car and the wall! 435 
The attitudinal adverbial and the interjection in these examples trigger a description of 436 
the speaker’s happiness because the said lady was not stuck between the car and the 437 
wall. However, the expressive AP would give rise to a description of an attitude of 438 
disdain, scorn, criticism, etc., which the speaker projects towards the lady in question. 439 
In this sense, expressive APs and expletive NPs behave like slurs such as ‘hori’ or 440 
‘chink’, which target a disparaging attitude at a social group that is identified by their 441 
conceptual, descriptive content (Blakemore 2015) 442 
In the examples above the attitudes expressed in relation to the proposition –443 
positive– and to the said lady –negative– are opposed, but the same sort of attitude 444 
may simultaneously be expressed regarding both a proposition and one of its 445 
constituents: 446 
(30) Shit!/Oh, fuck! That fucking lady did not get stuck between the car and the wall! 447 
Despite differences in the outcomes of the instructions encoded by interjections and 448 
expressive APs and expletive NPs, their respective procedural semantics may interact 449 
and result in more precisely built higher-level explicatures and attitudinal descriptions 450 
about propositional constituents. In other words, occurrence of interjections and 451 
expressive APs or expletive NPs in the same utterance could provide more evidence 452 
for the construction of similar attitudinal descriptions about the whole proposition 453 
expressed and a constituent therein, respectively. Thus, those tokens of showing 454 
would mutually reinforce each other and lend support for the construction of similar 455 
emotional-state descriptions, even if with distinct scopes.  456 
A similar interaction may arise with the procedural meaning of intonation, mood or 457 
word order, thus triggering attitudinal descriptions that might include information about 458 
the speaker’s emotions or feelings, and/or the manner in which she performs an action. 459 
If imperative mood and word order (31a) give rise to a speech-act description like that 460 
in (31b), occurrence of an expressive AP (31c) could make the hearer develop the 461 
higher-level explicature in (31b) as in (31d): 462 
(31) a. Give me that pen! 463 
b. The speaker tells the hearer to give her that penx. 464 
c. Give me that fucking pen! 465 
d. The speaker (very) angrily tells the hearer to give her that penx. 466 
Likewise, if interrogative word order and intonation (32a) enact the higher-level 467 
explicature in (32b), addition of an expressive AP (32c) would yield a more complex 468 
higher-level explicature capturing nuances of the speaker’s attitude (32d): 469 
(32) a. Do you have that pen? 470 
b. The speaker asks/wonders whether the hearer has penx. 471 
c. Do you have that fucking pen? 472 
d. The speaker angrily/anxiously asks/wonders whether the hearer has penx. 473 
Thus, expressive APs may emphasise imperative or interrogative force and add further 474 
overtones of irritation, anger, indignation, curiosity, anxiety or wrath, to name but a few. 475 
An anonymous reviewer of this paper and Raeber and Wharton (2017) point out that 476 
the participles, adjectives and nouns that can be used as expressive APs or expletive 477 
NPs may sometimes have the intensifying function characteristic of adjectives like 478 
‘sheer’, as in the following examples: 479 
(33) This gives me sheer enjoyment. 480 
(34) The cake is fucking delicious/damn good! 481 
(35) a. John is a fucking idiot. 482 
b. Curro es un puto crack. 483 
‘Curro is a fucking star’. 484 
The expressive usage of those participles, adjectives and nouns must certainly be 485 
differentiated from their usage as intensifiers. When intensifying, they would definitely 486 
not trigger descriptions of the speaker’s attitude towards the noun they co-occur with, 487 
so that procedure would be blocked or impeded. Rather, those participles, adjectives 488 
and nouns could give rise to the construction of ad hoc concepts. The head nouns and 489 
adjectives they intensify are scalar: there are degrees of enjoyment, 490 
deliciousness/goodness, idiocy or stardom. In their intensifying usage, those 491 
participles, adjectives and nouns would enact the construction of the occasion-specific 492 
concepts ENJOYMENT*, GOOD*/DELICIOUS*, IDIOT* and CRACK*/STAR*, which would 493 
idiosyncratically move something up alleged scales of enjoyment, 494 
deliciousness/goodness, idiocy or stardom.  495 
Arguing that those participles, adjectives and nouns could also trigger a procedure 496 
that differs from the one they activate when used as proper expressives raises the 497 
following question: if procedural meaning is monosemic (Carston 2016: 159-161), 498 
which procedure would expressive APs and expletive NPs really encode? The answer 499 
to this question may be given on the basis of the notion of meta-procedure, or an 500 
instruction to activate a particular procedure from among a set of candidate ones 501 
(Wharton 2009; Wilson 2011, 2012, 2016). Accordingly, the procedural semantics of 502 
the participles, adjectives and nouns that may be used both as expressives and as 503 
intensifiers would not be restricted to any of the two procedures mentioned above, but 504 
would amount to a meta-procedure that forces, so to say, the selection of the 505 
appropriate procedure from a set comprising construction of an attitudinal description 506 
about a constituent or construction of an ad hoc concept. Activation of the latter 507 
procedure may be favoured by the scalar nature of the noun or adjective they co-occur 508 
with and meta-linguistic or encyclopaedic knowledge concerning the interpretation of 509 
this lexical combination. Just as slurs give access to assumptions about the range of 510 
attitudes that their users may hold towards the group of individuals that they denote 511 
(Blakemore 2015: 31-34), individuals may access assumptions about the outputs of 512 
the participles, adjectives and nouns under analysis when occurring with diverse 513 
phrasal heads, which may bias the activation of one or the other procedure. 514 
Accordingly, the participles, adjectives and nouns preceding nominal or adjectival 515 
heads and lacking a clear descriptive content could put hearers in a state wherein they 516 
have to activate a particular procedure out of a set of two candidate ones. The head 517 
and encyclopaedic information about the specific element with which it combines may 518 
determine which procedure must be enacted. 519 
 520 
4.2. Possible implications 521 
The more restricted scope of the attitudinal descriptions triggered by expressive APs, 522 
expletive NPs and slurs might prevent those descriptions from being neatly subsumed 523 
by the relevance-theoretic notion of higher-level explicature, provided this is to be 524 
strictly applied to conceptual schemas about attitudes or emotions that are solely 525 
projected towards whole propositions. As currently formulated, this notion does not 526 
seem to capture the fact that hearers also forge descriptions reflecting speakers’ 527 
attitude(s) towards specific conceptual constituents of the propositions that they 528 
express, i.e. towards only a portion of what speakers say. Therefore, the distinction 529 
between lower- and higher-level explicatures could need refining in order to 530 
accommodate these attitudinal descriptions. Two solutions seem plausible, then. 531 
The first, and simpler one, is modifying the definition of higher-level explicature so 532 
that it is not solely restricted to attitudinal descriptions about whole propositions, but 533 
also includes the shorter-ranging attitudinal descriptions that expressive APs, expletive 534 
NPs and slurs trigger. This more parsimonious solution does not contravene Occam’s 535 
razor principle and would involve loosening the term ‘higher-level explicature’ so as to 536 
encompass any attitudinal description constructed regardless of whether it is about a 537 
whole proposition or a constituent or portion of a proposition.  538 
The second solution amounts to coining a new label as a way of differentiating an 539 
additional type of attitudinal description that only takes within its scope a propositional 540 
constituent: intermediate-level explicature. In relevance-theoretic terms, a lower-level 541 
explicature is the truth-evaluable propositional form resulting from the pragmatic 542 
enrichment of a decoded logical form, while a higher-level explicature is the conceptual 543 
schema referring to the speaker’s emotions, feelings or attitudes, which is inferentially 544 
constructed upon perception of some manifest fact, object, event or propositional 545 
content and subsequent activation of some attitude- or emotion-related concept 546 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). Metaphorically, a 547 
lower-level explicature could be portrayed as a Meccano block containing smaller 548 
pieces –concepts and pragmatically enriched variables. That whole block may be 549 
inserted inside another larger block corresponding to the higher-level explicature –the 550 
block would be like some sort of subordinate structure, while the larger block within 551 
which it is inserted would be like some sort of superordinate structure. However, the 552 
pieces corresponding to concepts may in turn be inserted into bigger pieces or blocks 553 
that would still fit in the lower-level explicature block. One such bigger piece or block 554 
would be an intermediate-level explicature. Graphically, an intermediate-level 555 
explicature could be represented as follows: 556 
(Insert Figure 1 here)  557 
The term ‘intermediate-level explicature’ would capture the idea that some attitudinal 558 
descriptions need not subsume a whole proposition, but a smaller fragment or a portion 559 
of it. To put it differently, this term would capture the intuitions that speakers express 560 
emotional states –i.e. perform expressive acts– about propositions and their 561 
constituents and that hearers may forge some mental structures to somehow portray 562 
those acts. Were this second solution actually plausible, an intermediate-level 563 
explicature could be defined as an emotional-state description constructed as a 564 
consequence of a procedure activated by elements like expressive APs, expletive NPs 565 
and slurs. That description would consist of attitude- or emotion-related concepts, and 566 
would only take within its scope any phrasal constituent of a proposition, so it need not 567 
be restricted to a particular syntactic constituent like the subject or the direct object, 568 
but could affect the head of any propositional constituent. Accordingly, the 569 
‘explicaturial’ structure of an utterance like (36) could be glossed as in figure 2: 570 
(36) Wow, that fucking lady was hit by the lamp! 571 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 572 
Higher-level explicatures are mental conceptual schemas that somehow reflect the 573 
attitude expressed towards a proposition, or, in other words, an expressive act whose 574 
sincerity is normally presupposed –it would make little sense to say that someone who 575 
shrieks in pain is not feeling pain, for instance. Moreover, higher-level explicatures do 576 
not affect the truth-conditions of the proposition that they take within their scope (see 577 
the tests in Section 2). Inasmuch as an intermediate-level explicature also captures 578 
another expressive act, even if this only affects a constituent of a proposition, it is also 579 
non-truth-evaluable and has no impact on the truth-conditional content of that 580 
proposition. Although such an act is connected with the proposition as long as it 581 
consists of the expression of some emotional state caused by or felt about one of its 582 
constituents, intermediate-level explicatures are independent of lower-level 583 
explicatures and do not contribute to them. While lower-level explicatures are 584 
constructed after a decoded logical form is pragmatically enriched through 585 
disambiguation, conceptual adjustment, reference assignment and recovery of 586 
unarticulated constituents, intermediate-level explicatures are constructed once 587 
emotions are, so to say, ‘read’ on the basis of perceptible cues –i.e. paralanguage, 588 
interjections, intonation, expressives, etc.– and a conceptual schema portraying them 589 
is generated. 590 
The appropriateness of the term ‘explicature’ to label this additional attitudinal 591 
description has been questioned by another anonymous reviewer. ‘Explicature’ is used 592 
here following the definition and characterisation of the two types of mental structures 593 
–i.e. the pragmatically enriched logical form, or lower-level explicature, and the 594 
conceptual schema portraying feelings, emotions or attitudes, or higher-level 595 
explicature– making up the explicit content of utterances given by Sperber and Wilson 596 
(1986/1995). Both structures are built on the basis of elements encoding conceptual 597 
meaning, procedural meaning or a combination of both; in other words, explicatures 598 
result from decoding and inference upon perception of certain intentionally produced 599 
(para)linguistic elements, and this is precisely why they are part of the explicit content 600 
of utterances. Explicatures are not the result of accessing and relating implicated 601 
premises in order to derive implicated conclusions. 602 
Lower- and higher-level explicatures may be strong or weak depending on the 603 
reliance on decoding or the amount of inference needed for their construction. The 604 
more reliance on encoded material, the stronger the explicatures; the more inferential 605 
work needed, the weaker they are (Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004). Accordingly, 606 
‘explicature’ is used here to label the emotional-state descriptions described because 607 
their construction rests either on pure tokens of showing activating procedures for 608 
reading emotions or on tokens combining showing and meaningNN which are, 609 
therefore, amenable to both inference and decoding. To put it differently, the shorter-610 
ranging attitudinal descriptions described in this paper are explicatures because they 611 
are inferentially built as a consequence of the procedural meaning encoded by 612 
expressive APs or expletive NPs, or require decoding and some amount of inferential 613 
work. If the expressives giving rise to those descriptions completely lacked conceptual 614 
meaning and their construction required a considerable amount of inference, 615 
intermediate-level explicatures would be weak. In contrast, if those expressive 616 
elements encoded some conceptual content, even if vague, the intermediate-level 617 
explicature would be stronger. 618 
Whether the constituent-focused attitudinal descriptions discussed in this paper are 619 
exclusively triggered by expressive APs, expletive NPs and slurs is another issue 620 
raised by the second anonymous reviewer of this paper. Relevance theorists have 621 
shown that in metalinguistic negation speakers metarepresent a whole linguistic 622 
expression, part of it or some of its characteristics –e.g. the way it is pronounced– and 623 
express an attitude of rejection towards the metarepresented content. In other words, 624 
speakers make an echo in order to object to the truth-conditional properties of an 625 
expression, the very usage of that expression or any of its constituent elements –e.g. 626 
specific lexical items (Carston 1994, 2002; Carston and Noh 1995). Similarly, with irony 627 
speakers echo utterances, unarticulated thoughts or norms attributable to (an)other 628 
individual(s), and express a dissociative attitude (Sperber and Wilson 1998; Wilson 629 
2006, 2009, 2013; Wilson and Sperber 2007, 2012). Also, by means of intonation, 630 
sentence stress or some gestures, fragments of utterances may be highlighted as a 631 
way to set contrasts, focalise them or convey diverse attitudes towards their 632 
constituents and achieve diverse affective effects (Scott 2017; Wharton 2012).  633 
In all these cases hearers would construct attitudinal descriptions limited to 634 
sentential constituents. When the usage of a word, phrase or pronunciation is objected 635 
to in metalinguistic negation, the metarepresented content would be embedded into a 636 
conceptual schema capturing the attitude of rejection expressed towards it. Likewise, 637 
in those cases in which speakers echo (an) element(s) of a proffered proposition or 638 
attributed thought, and express a dissociative attitude towards it/them, that/those 639 
element(s) would fall within the scope of a similar attitudinal description. Finally, if 640 
specific words are given prosodic prominence or signalled by means of gestures as a 641 
way to achieve some affective effects, hearers would also construct an emotional-state 642 
description restricted to those words. 643 
Still, diminutives –e.g. ‘doggie’, ‘dearie’– could also have similar effects. Upon using 644 
them, speakers do not express an attitude or emotion towards a whole proposition, but 645 
towards the individual, animal or object mentioned. Therefore, diminutives could also 646 
be argued to trigger emotional-state descriptions taking within their scope a referent 647 
named, which features as a propositional constituent.  648 
Further elements likely to trigger a shorter-ranging attitudinal description could be, 649 
according to said reviewer, hearsay particles (Blass 1989, 1990; Itani 1994, 1998). 650 
Together with illocutionary adverbials (‘frankly’, ‘seriously’, etc.), evidential adverbials 651 
(‘obviously’, ‘clearly’, etc.), hearsay adverbials (‘allegedly’, ‘reportedly’, etc.) and 652 
parenthetical expressions (‘they say’, ‘I hear’, etc.), such particles belong to the rich 653 
group of evidentials, which indicate the sort of evidence on which speakers rely when 654 
making assertions or claims, or their degree of commitment to what they say (Ifantidou 655 
1993a, 1993b, 2001; Wilson 1999; Wilson and Sperber 1993): 656 
(37) a. Reportedly, the man only sent two parcels. 657 
b. The man only sent two parcels, they say. 658 
Although evidentials are currently analysed as devices contributing to the activation 659 
of the mechanisms assessing the reliability and credibility of information and informers 660 
(Wilson 2012, 2016), they also express attitudes of (un)certainty, doubt or scepticism 661 
towards what is said. However, those attitudes are projected to whole propositions, as 662 
indicated by their loose insertion into the syntax of the utterances where they occur, so 663 
they would not enact attitudinal descriptions like those discussed in this paper. Were 664 
there a type of evidentials giving rise to conceptual schemas reflecting similar attitudes 665 
and only affecting a sentential constituent, it would be that of participial adjectives like 666 
‘suspected’, ‘alleged’ or ‘presumed’ preceding nominal heads. In addition to alerting 667 
the mechanisms determining trust-allocation, those participles would transmit the said 668 
attitudes towards the referent of the noun they pre-modify, thus indicating that a 669 
property or condition denoted by that noun should not yet be attributed to its referent 670 
at the time of speaking (Author, forthcoming): 671 
(38) Suspected/Alleged murderer imprisoned. 672 
Expressive APs and expletive NPs pose a further problem: the words functioning in 673 
this way come from various lexical categories whose elements initially contained 674 
conceptual content. Their varied provenance prevents them from constituting a natural 675 
class on the basis of their (new) function. A holistic analysis of expressive APs and 676 
expletive NPs, however, must also delve into the processes enabling the elements of 677 
distinct categories to acquire an expressive function. Those processes are of a lexical 678 
nature and are addressed in the following Section, which shows that the relevance-679 
theoretic ideas and claims about lexical pragmatics can be applied to account for 680 
semantic and functional change (Clark 2016). 681 
 682 
5. On the development of expressive functions 683 
Morphologically, expressive APs and expletive NPs are transferred from the categories 684 
of nouns, adjectives or verbs, whose elements are conceptual. However, these 685 
expressives do not share the morphosyntactic features characteristic of prototypical 686 
nouns, adjectives and verbs –i.e. intensification, gradation, etc. Their usage as 687 
expressives could have been due to a process of grammaticalisation that progressively 688 
endowed them with a new morphosyntactic status and a new function (Hopper 1991; 689 
Hopper and Traugott 1993; Oppermann-Marsaux 2008; Traugott 1989, 1995). Such 690 
grammaticalisation may also be seen as a process of subjectification that deprived 691 
words contributing to the proposition expressed and its truth conditions of their initial 692 
conceptual semantics –i.e. deconceptualisation– and provided them with a procedural 693 
semantics –i.e. proceduralisation (Traugott 1992, 1995). But what triggered that 694 
deconceptualisation or how did it take place? An answer may be attempted on the 695 
grounds of some lexical phenomena and processes frequent in children’s speech. 696 
Conceptual meaning is mutable and amenable to inferential operations resulting in 697 
occasion-specific meanings (Carston 1997, 2002, 2013, 2016; Sperber and Wilson 698 
2008; Wałaszewska 2015; Wilson 2004; Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007). Narrowing 699 
restricts encoded concepts to more specific senses or denotations (Wilson 2004: 344), 700 
thus making words denote just a portion of those concepts (Carston and Powell 2005: 701 
283). Words preserve their literal meaning because the logical entry of their lexicalised 702 
concepts is not altered or lost (Hall 2011: 2; Wałaszewska 2011: 317), but one or some 703 
components of their encyclopaedic entry is/are given prominence and achieve(s) a 704 
content-constitutive status (Carston 2002: 339). In contrast, broadening loosens or 705 
expands the linguistically encoded denotation so that words convey more general 706 
senses (Wilson and Carston 2007: 234). Words do not preserve their literal meaning 707 
because one or more of the logical properties of their encoded concepts is/are 708 
eliminated (Hall 2011: 4; Wałaszewska 2011: 318).  709 
The grammaticalisation of lexical items as expressive APs or expletive NPs might 710 
have been due to a progressive broadening that expanded their denotation well 711 
beyond their initial limits and diluted it. The encyclopaedic entries of the concepts 712 
initially encoded by those words could have contained information about stereotypical 713 
characteristics of the individuals, objects, actions or properties to which they were 714 
normally applied (Gehweiler 2008), as well as information about attitudes, feelings or 715 
emotions which those individuals, objects, actions or properties would recurrently 716 
(have) cause(d), the range and variety of which might have varied across individuals 717 
as a result of personal experience (Kecskes 2004, 2008). For instance, the 718 
encyclopaedic entry of the concept PUTO of the initial noun ‘puto’ (‘male prostitute’) in 719 
some speakers could have stored information regarding feelings of repulsion, 720 
revulsion, censure, despise, etc., caused by the sort of person denoted by that noun, 721 
while the initial concept FUCK encoded by the verb ‘fuck’ could have comprised 722 
encyclopaedic information about a range of positive feelings like pleasure, delight, 723 
happiness, etc., and negative ones like bother, pain, discomfort, nuisance, annoyance, 724 
etc. As those concepts were broadened, the words encoding them could progressively 725 
start to point to the emotions, feelings or attitudes caused by the entities or actions 726 
they initially denoted. This extension of the denotation of some words to refer to 727 
emotional states to some extent resembles what children often do when acquiring their 728 
mother tongue (Wałaszewska 2011). 729 
Children often extend or overextend the meaning of words to refer to other entities 730 
or actions sharing some perceptible properties (Anglinn 1977; Clark 1973, 1993; 731 
Thomson and Chapman 1977). Overextensions are frequent when children miss or 732 
cannot retrieve words at the time of speaking, so they replace them with others 733 
(Fremgen and Fay 1980; Gottfield 1992; Huttenlocher 1974; Thomson and Chapman 734 
1977). Their limited expressive abilities –i.e. lexical gaps or failure to use vocabulary– 735 
are responsible for the apparent misuse of vocabulary. In the case of the words giving 736 
rise to expressive APs and expletive NPs, it would be hard to establish connections 737 
between their initial referents and specific emotional states on the grounds of 738 
perceptual resemblance. Rather, lack of precise terms, urgency, pressure or haste 739 
when speaking could in part have prompted their usage to express them. The problem 740 
is why those words were selected and not others. 741 
Possessing the adequate words does not prevent children from mislabeling objects, 742 
individuals or animals not only because of perceptual similarity, but also because of 743 
some shared property or common encyclopaedic information. This unveils early “[…] 744 
metaphorical ability” and “[…] linguistic flexibility” (Wałaszewska 2011: 320). 745 
Metaphorical usage could explain the grammaticalisation of some nouns, adjectives or 746 
verbs as expressives: nouns and verbs are often used metaphorically, and even 747 
hyperbolically, in order to denote a situation, event, object or entity on the basis of 748 
some contingent or emergent property, or because those nouns or verbs somehow 749 
evoke them, as in the following examples: 750 
(39) This is hell/shit/heaven! 751 
(40) a. The teacher fucked me on the exam. 752 
b. Me han follado en el examen. 753 
(41) ¡Esto es la hostia! 754 
These utterances do not literally assert that something or a situation is ‘hell’, ‘shit’ or 755 
‘heaven’ (39); that a teacher had sexual intercourse with the speaker (40), or that 756 
something is the ‘holy host’ (41). Rather, a wide array of assumptions would be 757 
manifest to speakers regarding, for instance, and respectively, suffering, penance, 758 
torture, etc.; pleasure, delight, joy, etc.; superiority, supremacy, etc., or failure, ruin, 759 
etc., which they would associate with the employed noun or verb. Such association 760 
might further be possible because the encyclopaedic entries of their encoded concepts 761 
could contain information about attitudes, feelings or emotions usually caused by the 762 
denoted referents, which would be similar to the positive or negative ones that the 763 
speakers intended to express at the moment of speaking. Reiteration of such 764 
connections could broaden the conceptual content of those words and lead them to 765 
progressively allude to something with which they share some properties or which is 766 
evoked by them. A similar broadening extending the concepts encoded by certain 767 
nouns, adjectives and verbs to more peripheral properties as a result of metaphorical 768 
or hyperbolical usages might also in part underlie their expressive usage. 769 
Children’s overextensions fall into two types (Wałaszewska 2011: 321-322): 770 
a) Over-inclusion or categorical/classic overextension (Clark 1973, 1993; Rescorla 771 
1980), whereby words are applied to members of other categories within the 772 
same or an adjacent conceptual domain (Wałaszewska 2011: 321). For example, 773 
‘doggie’ may also refer to cats, cows or horses owing to perceptual similarities –774 
four legs– and conceptual contiguity –being animals. 775 
b) Analogical (over)extension (Clark 1993; Rescorla 1980), whereby words 776 
belonging to a particular conceptual domain are applied to other objects with 777 
which they only share some resemblance. For instance, the roundness of cookies 778 
and the moon leads some children to refer to the latter as a ‘cookie’. 779 
The proceduralisation of content words as expressives cannot be accounted for as 780 
a result of analogical extension because of a lack of perceptual resemblance between 781 
their initial denotation and emotional states. Despite clearly perceivable reflexes, 782 
emotions are ineffable, internal and personal. Over-inclusion seems a better candidate, 783 
then: the encyclopaedic entry of their encoded concepts could include information 784 
about properties of the referents, reactions or emotions they may cause, or common 785 
attitudes towards them, which may resemble, be applicable to, evoke or be evoked by 786 
certain emotional states. Repeated access to this information could create a link in the 787 
logical entry of the concepts initially encoded with new, non-lexicalised concepts 788 
referring to emotional states. Thus, the information of the logical entry of the initially 789 
encoded concepts –e.g. that such words denote individuals, actions or conditions– 790 
would be ignored and those words could activate concepts like POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 791 
EMOTION or more specific ones like HAPPINESS, SADNESS, PAIN, NUISANCE, etc. 792 
Accordingly, an encoded concept like FUCK could be broadened to FUCK* and allude to 793 
some emotion, even if that broadened concept would still need adjusting as 794 
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE EMOTION or even as HAPPINESS, SURPRISE, WRATH or HATRED. In turn, 795 
DAMN could be broadened to the emotion-related concept DAMN* and be subsequently 796 
adjusted as PAIN or NUISANCE. The output of such adjustment will depend on 797 
paralanguage, assumptions about the speaker, setting, recent events, objects or 798 
individuals alluded to, which explains why a particular expressive may result in various, 799 
distinct attitudinal descriptions (Blakemore 2011: 3542-3544; Wharton 2009, 2016). 800 
A broadened concept would somehow capture the emotional state that the speaker 801 
needs to express, while inferential adjustment would yield a more specific concept 802 
capturing actual nuances of the emotional state in question, such as the specific type 803 
of emotion or the intensity with which it is experienced. Although the broadening of the 804 
conceptual content of the words giving rise to expressive APs and expletive NPs may 805 
be seen as a case of over-inclusion triggered by the need to allude to something 806 
elusive like feelings or emotions, the existence of secondary interjections such as 807 
‘fuck!’ or ‘damn!’, which have already stabilised as expressives in their own right in a 808 
language or language variety, could also enact or facilitate that broadening. Indeed, 809 
the expressive functions and meaning of many secondary interjections –which, like 810 
expressive APs and expletive NPs, are words coming from various lexical categories– 811 
may be due to an extreme broadening that enables them to refer to emotional states 812 
(Author 2017). Once the process whereby the words giving rise to those interjections 813 
is spread and stabilises in a language or variety, it would be relatively easy to repeat 814 
and apply it to other words in order to get new expressive devices. 815 
The concepts initially encoded by the words giving rise to expressive APs and 816 
expletive NPs, then, would be broadened and get their denotation over-extended in 817 
such a way that those words would become associated with emotional states. The 818 
generalisation of that broadening among language users would favour its stabilisation 819 
in communities of practice or geographical groups, and specialise those words for 820 
expressive functions. The interpretation of those expressives would in some cases 821 
require the construction of occasion-specific attitudinal descriptions, for which 822 
activated emotion-related concepts would have to be adjusted; in other cases, the 823 
stabilisation of a broadening would restrict the range of possible attitudinal descriptions 824 
amenable to construction, as the resulting expressives would be associated with more 825 
specific emotion-related concepts in a more stable manner. 826 
 827 
6. Conclusion 828 
Expressive APs and expletive NPs partake in the procedural semantics of expressives 829 
in general, but differ from some of them as regards their output. Like slurs, they enact 830 
attitudinal descriptions that only affect a propositional constituent. Accommodation of 831 
these shorter-ranging mental schemas in the relevance-theoretic notional apparatus 832 
may be done in two ways. One of them would involve refining the distinction between 833 
lower- and higher-level explicatures by introducing a new label for them. These 834 
descriptions have also been shown not to be solely triggered by the expressive devices 835 
discussed in this paper, but also by metalinguistic negation, irony, prosody, diminutives 836 
or some evidentials.  837 
Terms of endearment or affection often used as vocatives in order to refer to the 838 
addressee –e.g. ‘honey’, ‘darling’– could analogously be thought to give rise to similar 839 
emotional-state descriptions. However, the format and place where those descriptions 840 
are constructed within the mental representation of utterances are issues that still 841 
deserve more detailed consideration and onto which future research could probably 842 
shed some light. Arguably, if vocatives refer to the addressee, and reference to him is 843 
normally made in the higher-level explicature, the emotional-state description that 844 
vocatives result in would not take within its scope a propositional constituent, but a 845 
constituent of the higher-level explicature. Therefore, that sort of conceptual schema 846 
could not be subsumed by the label proposed in this paper, provided it was accepted, 847 
and would require a new one reflecting this peculiarity. 848 
Finally, the development of expressive functions by items from distinct lexical 849 
categories has been suggested to result from a broadening affecting their semantics. 850 
More specifically, that broadening has been argued to resemble an over-extension of 851 
their initially encoded concepts similar to those children often do. Thus, this paper has 852 
additionally provided support for the applicability of the relevance-theoretic postulates 853 
on lexical pragmatic processes (Clark 2016). 854 
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